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The Fault Isolation Expert System for Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
System (TDRSS) Applications (FIESTA) is a fault detection and fault
diagnosis expert system being developed as a decision aid to support
operations in the Network Control Center (NCC) for NASA's Space Network.
Thls paper presents the operational objectives which influenced FIESTA
development and provides an overview of the architecture used to achieve
these goals. The approach to the knowledge engineering effort and the
methodology employed are also presented and illustrated with examples
i
drawn from the FIESTA domain.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This paper discusses the FAULT ISOLATION EXPERT SYSTEM for TDRSS
APPLICATIONS (FIESTA). FIESTA is an expert system which is being
developed to provide operator support in the Network Control Center
(NCC) at Goddard Space Flight Center in the area of fault isolation.
Section 2 provides an overview of the Space Network and the role of the
NCC. Section 3 describes the development environment established for
FIESTA project effort.
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Section 4 discusses operational concepts which have influenced the
development and the displays which support these components. Section 5
presents an outline of the system architecture which supports the
processing required to realize the operational concepts. Section 6_hen
describes the fault isolation methodology which FIESTA employs to
provide the desired system capabilities focusing on knowledge
engineering aspects of the FIESTA project.
2.0 SPACE NETWORK OVERVIEW
Figure 1 illustrates NASA's Space Network (SN) which combines space and
ground segments to provide tracking and data acquisition services For
spacecraft in near-Earth orbit (200 to 12000 km). The space segment of
the baseline Space Network will consist of two operational geostationary
satellites, Tracking and Data Relay Satellite East and West (TDRS-E and
TDRS-W), as well as one spare satellite. From their geosynchronous
orbit, the two operational satellites will be able to provide services
to user spacecraft during 85 to 100 percent of their orbits. The TDR
satellites are monitored and controlled from the White Sands Ground
Terminal (WSGT), in White Sands, New Mexico. Collocated with WSGT is
the NASA Ground Terminal (NGT), which provides the communications
interface for the transfer of data from WSGT to the other Space Network
elements and users, via the NASA Communications (NASCOM) network.
The Network Control Center (NCC) is the operations control facility For
the entire Space Network. It serves as the focal point to network
elements and user spacecraft facilities for coordination of all network
support, and resolution of problems. The NCC's primary Functions
include scheduling network resources, equipment configuration direction,
and service quality monitoring and assurance.
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Role of the Network Control Center (NCC) in Problem Detection/Fault
Isolation
Based on requests from user spacecraft control Facilities, the NCC
schedules "events", consisting of one or more services For a single
user. Prior to the start of the event, Schedule Orders (SHOs) are
transmitted by NCC to the network elements, indicating the start and
stop time of each service, and specific configuration information.
During real-time operations, NCC operations personnel monitor the status
of network services to detect anomalies so that corrective action can be
promptly initiated. The real-time nature of many user spacecraft oper-
ations, together with the high bandwidth data flow through the Space
Network, combine to increase the critically of NCC's fault detection and
isolation responsibilities. It is essential that problems are detected
immediately, and service outages are resolved quickly, to minimize data
loss and impact to the user mission. This function requires that NCC
controllers and analysts continuously monitor network performance
indicators, and compare expected versus actual values to detect
anomalies. The NCC does not monitor user spacecraft telemetry, command,
or tracking data directly. Rather, NCC receives network performance
data (related to user services) in the Form of high-speed electronic
messages From the Space Network elements.
From WSGT, NCC receives Operations Data Messages (ODMs) every 5 seconds.
These are generated by the Automatic Data Processing (ADP) equipment at
WSGT, and indicate the status of all ongoing services through the TDRSS.
They include such parameters as RF beam pointing angles, link status,
signal strength, and bit error rate. At NGT, data quality monitoring is
performed using Frame Analyzers. Data quality information produced by
the Frame Analyzers is combined into Fault Isolation Monitoring System
(FIMS) reports, which are sent to the NCC every 5 seconds. These
messages include parameters such as frame sync lock status, and
percentage of frames in lock. Figure 2 illustrates the additional
high-speed message flow which is currently available to support NCC
operations.
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Currently, the contents of these messagesare combined and presented on
display screens to NCCoperations personnel. Network Controllers and
Performance Analysts monitor these displays, as well as ground control
(reconfiguration) messagesthat alter the scheduled equipment configu-
ration, to detect problems and determine appropriate courses of action.
This task is an extremely labor intensive process. The quantity of in-
formation contained in the messagesrequires at least one (and in some
cases two) display screens per service.
At the time of this writing, only one TDRSis operational, supporting a
small numberof user spacecraft. The Network Controllers and Network
PerformanceAnalysts are able to work together in teams to provide com-
plete coverage of all ongoing services. However, they are reaching an
information saturation point. Whenthe second TDRSis launched, and the
numberof user spacecraft increases, the manual approach to network mon-
itoring and fault detection/isolation will be inadequate. Someform oF
automation will be needed in order for the NCCto satisfy its mission-
critical requirement to assure the quality and continuity of Space Net-
work services. The purpose of FIESTAis to provide an intelligent as-
sistant to the Space Network Controllers and Performance Analysts, that
will continuously monitor selected services, detect faults, bring these
faults to the attention of the controller/analyst, and isolate the
source of a problem to the major system componentlevel.
3.0 THEPROTOTYPED VELOPMENTENVIRONMENT
The FIESTAprototype is currently being built in an off-line environment.
This parallels conventional software development in which on-line vali-
dation occurs after off-line development and thorough system testing.
The off-line development environment is madeto look as muchas possible
like the NCCin terms of the data available and the software environment.
A decision was madeearly to use a front end processor to isolate and
simulate NCCinterface functions. The benefit of this approach is that
it separates the procedural interface functions from the knowledge-based
functions that are the primary interests of the project.
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High SpeedMessage(HSM)traffic from the Space Network is recorded at
the NCC. Thesemagnetic tapes provide "Automatically-obtainable situa-
tion data" (AOSD)used by the FIESTAstandalone prototype. Data sources
include actual missions as well as simulations run to create test data
sets.
The FIESTAprototype consists of two computers and two bodies of soft-
ware that communicatevia commercially available networking tools. For
the expert system component, the decision was madeto use "off-the-shelf"
hardware and a well supported expert system development shell. Such
tools provide essential capabilities (e.g., an inference engine, a flex-
Ible data and knowledge representation language) and allow the develop-
ment effort to be focused on the knowledgeengineering task. Inference
Corporation's Automated ReasoningTool (ART) hosted on a Symbolics 3640
Lisp Machine was chosen. The FIESTAFront EndProcessor (FFEP)was pro-
totyped on a VAX11/730. The VAXwas used for the sake of convenience
and compatibility with other tools.
The NCC Simulator and AOSD Transformer
The FFEP software was christened "NSAT" for NCC Simulator and AOSD
Transformer software. The NSAT was built to perform the following func-
tions for the FIESTA prototype's development:
Q To "simulate" the NCC insofar as providing AOSD to the rest of
FIESTA,
To isolate the expert system components from the preprocessing
functions performed in the NSAT, the goals being to make the
expert system component think it is Fielded and to isolate NCC
interface functions,
To offload the Lisp Machine, translating coded HSM values to
symbolic expressions amenable to use by the expert system
application, and
To provide a tool useful in development and testing of FIESTA -
one For "feeding" the expert system components controlled
amounts of data at controlled times; the programmer needs a
tool to replay given scenarios to test and debug the expert
system.
..J
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Figure 3 depicts the main componentsand data flows of the prototype.
The prototype has been implemented in the STI development lab shown in
Figure 4. The NSATreads and translates AOSDfrom a disk file,
transmitting it to the Lisp Machine under user control. A synchronizing
Lisp Machine process reads AOSDover the net and does a bit of
housekeeping. It makesthe AOSDavailable in the Lisp world for the
FIESTAprocess. (The Lisp Machine has only one address space so that
global symbols can be used to pass arbitrary objects between Lisp
Machineprocesses.) The FIESTAprocess then parses the AOSDand asserts
it as a set of "facts" (one fact per service) into the ARTdatabase.
Whenasserted as facts this data becomesavailable automatically to
fault detection and diagnosis rules.
4.0 FIESTAOPERATOR/SYSTEMINTERFACE
The basic operational concept for FIESTAis to support NCCoperations by
automating network monitoring and fault detection as well as the reason-
ing process involved in fault isolation. To support these functions
(monitoring, detection and isolationi, an effective operator interface
is required to allow FIESTAto serve as an intelligent decision aid.
This interface is provided by various types displays on a video
terminal. Someinformation needs to be continuously and immediately
available to the operator. This information includes the current
services being monitored, their status, time of the latest message
received, and an area for the display of alarm notifications. The
current FIESTAsystem status and an operator options interface are also
required. This information is grouped in a reserved area at the top of
the screen. The space below is then free space, which the operators can
customize with the displays of immediate interest. These five key
windows are shownin Figure 5.
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4.1 MONITORING DISPLAYS
Monitoring display are provided in several ways. The services window
provides a high-level summary of the service status by reporting it as
"acquiring", "nominal", "non-nominal", "transitional", or "late". A
status of "acquiring" indicates that the link is in the process of being
established, and dropouts should be expected. "Nominal" indicates that
a good link has been established and all data looks good. "Non-nominal"
signifies that bad data has been detected or that acquisition time is
excessive. "Transitional" indicates that the service had been non-
nominal, but now good data has returned. (to avoid treating rapid
transient dropouts as separate faults a stabilization period is
introduced before returning the status to nominal). Finally, "late"
indicates that there are less than two minutes of scheduled service time
remaining, a period when dropouts are common.
At a more detailed monitoring level, dynamic displays show relevant
parameters in the high-speed messages. These are available as either
cockpit or trending displays. Cockpit displays provide a "snapshot" of
the most important parameter values and are automatically refreshed as
new data arrives. The trending displays provide a history of parameter
variation updating the graphs with additional information as messages
are received. Figure 5 also provides example of each of these display
types.
4.2 FAULT DETECTION DISPLAYS
In order to draw special attention to the occurence of significant fault
related events, a notification window was implemented.
Whenever faults are detected or diagnoses are updated, a short message
indicating the affected services and time of occurrence is posted. This
is in addition to the summary status of non-nominal which will appear in
the service window when a fault is detected.
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4.3 FAULTISOLATIONDISPLAYS
Whenthe notification is acknowledgedby the operator, an explanation
window is displayed. This windowprovides a description of the anomaly
and the most likely diagnosis. The explanation window contains a
justification option. When"justification" is selected, another window
is opened which displays the evidence used in determining the conclusion
shown. Both of these displays are shonwin Figure 6.
Additional diagnosis support is provided by the alternative hypotheses
display. This display showsall the diagnostic alternatives currently
under consideration and the positive and negative evidence for each.
Further support as an intelligent decision aid is provided by the
RecommendedAction option. The recommendedaction window presents a
series of alternative actions in order of probable usefulness.
The types of screens presented support the display requirements associ-
ated with the operational concept. Both operators and humanfactors
engineers aided in the evaluation and evolution of the display concepts.
Their involvement has contributed to a display system which is now ready
for evaluation in an on-line environment.
5.0 ARCHITECTURALOVERVIEW
The FIESTAArchitecture was influenced by three critical elements.
Thesewere:
I The presence of independent data sources providing real-time
situation data
The requirements for supporting the operator interface to the
s_tem.
The function of reasoning and inferencing which was central to
the application.
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FIESTA rules ("productions") fall into three basic categories,
corresponding to the major architectural design drivers. These are:
1)
2)
3)
The front-end processor rules (interface to situation data);
The run-time monitor (interface to the operator); and
The expert system component (reasoning).
The expert/reasoning portion may be further subdivided into three parts
(Kernel, Diagnostic and Assistant) reflecting specific fault reasoning
functions performed by the system.
The FIESTA system architecture features three-way asynchronous operation
of data handling, reasoning, and operator interaction to coordinate the
elements involved. This asynchronous operation is accomplished by
interfacing all components through a central knowledge base. Figure 9
provides an overview of the system architecture. The FIESTA front-end
processor serves as a gateway for AOSD which is arriving from external
data sources in real time. The FIESTA reasoning expert combines the
situation data with its prestored knowledge base of rules, propositions,
and frames to derive conclusions about the health of the system.
Finally, the run-time monitor sends alerts and requested displays to the
operator. It also enables the operator to request more information or
enter any Manually Obtainable Situation Data (MOSD) that may be avail-
able. This data provides further information (via voice, special con-
sole, or hardcopy report) beyond that which is available automatically
through high-speed message traffic.
The synchronization necessary to coordinate these components is provided
by the fact database. The front-end processor, FIESTA expert, and run-
time monitor consist of processes and rules which maintain and monitor
this fact database. Activation of the rules is a data-driven Function
of the inference engine (provided by the ART package). Thus the proces-
sing of the inference engine addresses the problems associated with
dealing with external data sources in real-time while simultaneously
reasoning about the incoming data and responding to operator requests
for data/advice (without overly restricting the timing of those
-13-
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requests). Figure 7 summarizesthese architectural concepts, indicating
the coordinating role played by the knowledge base and the groups of
rules which provides the system capabilities.
6.0 METHODOLOGY
This section discusses the fault isolation methodology applied to the
problem domainwith an emphasis on how the application domain structure
was mappedto a software design solution. The Following elements
comprise this domain structure:
Operational Support Organization
Acquisition Determination
Fault Detection
Fault Diagnosis
Uncertainty Management
In designing and developing a knowledge-basedsystem, it is extremely
important to recognize and take advantage of the natural organization of
this knowledge. The way the expert views and approaches the problem
should drive the design of the system.
__d
6.1 OPERATIONAL SUPPORT ORGANIZATION
Operational support at the Network Control Center is organized on a user
spacecraft basis. For example, during Space Shuttle flights, a Shuttle
operations team handles the Shuttle fault detection and diagnosis
responsibilities at the NCC. With other users, a different set of
operators is responsible for their support. Thus, operational specific
knowledge has developed around each individual user spacecraft with a
common base of general knowledge that is applicable to all users.
Real-time operations are organized on an event basis. An event is
defined as a scheduled support period For one user spacecraft for one
pass by the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS). The event can be
Further broken down by services within that event. A service is defined
-14-
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as a single comunication link provided by the network (e.g., Ku-Band
Single Access Return, or Multiple Access Return). All performance data
received at the NCC is service specific, and thus faults are detected
and diagnosed from a service perspective within the context of the event
in which they occur.
Space Shuttle support was selected for this initial FIESTA prototype
development. A Shuttle event consists of three services: S-Band Single
Access Forward (SSAF), S-Band Single Access Return (SSAR), and Ku-Band
Single Access Return (KSAR).
Figure I0 illustrates the type of data organization which was employed
to separate generic Shuttle support knowledge from event-specific
knowledge and event-specific knowledge from service-specific/fault-
related knowledge. (The ART development package supports this tree-like
organization, which includes inheritance, via its viewpoint mechanism.
The nodes are referred to as viewpoints and this terminology will be
employed).
The root viewpoint contains the static knowledge base (e.g., generic
knowledge of the Space Network) as well as the dynamic situation data.
The viewpoints sprouted off the root relate to separate user events
currently monitored by the operator. Event-specific knowledge, such as
appropriate nominal values and ranges, scheduled equipment chains, and
event status and trends, reside in this viewpoint. The event viewpoints
have access (through inheritance) to the background knowledge and
situation data from the root viewpoint. All monitoring and real-time
service support occurs in this event viewpoint.
When FIESTA detects an anomaly on a specific service, it sprouts a new
viewpoint off the affected event node. This is termed a diagnostic
episode. Detection of faults on other services will in turn result in
new (diagnostic episode) viewpoints sprouted off the event node. This
allows the system to independently reason about each diagnostic episode
MIS25G
and also to share information amongsimultaneous diagnostic episodes
(searching for commonalities) through the event viewpoint, where they
share a mutual parent.
6.2 ACQUISITIONDETERMINATION
The concept of acquisition plays a major role in FIESTA's diagnostic
approach due to signal behavior differences before, during, and after
acquisition. The normal event start time for the Shuttle precedes
actual signal and data acquisition by several minutes. This implies
that for the first several minutes of service the performance parameters
will indicate the presence of no signal and no data. As the Shuttle
comes into line-of-sight of the TDRS,the signal maybehave erratically
before finally locking up. Not until the signal exhibits steady signal-
strength and demodulator-lock values will the operators consider service
nominal. In addition, an important differentiation must be madebetween
signal and data acquisition because:
Signal acquisition can occur without data acquisition
The Shuttle may schedule data on a channel for an entire event
but only transmit on that channel for a portion of that event
Positive signal acquisition without data acquisition points
the problem to different diagnostic areas than combined
negative signal and data acquisition.
The FIESTA design had to account for these operational characteristics
to recognize that Shuttle services routinely lock up late, that erratic
behavior can be expected during acquisition, and that acquisition is a
two-step process (signal and data).
Immediately following event startup, FIESTA tracks the status of all
signal-related performance parameters for the return services. When
these parameters have remained nominal for two consecutive minutes on a
particular service, FIESTA determines acquisition is complete and will
_ -17-
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begin to monitor the service for ensuing anomalies. Any signal-related
out-of-range or out-of-tolerance conditions that are detected will no
longer be considered acquisition idiosyncrasies but actual Faults. At
this point FIESTA changes the status of the service from "ACQUIRING" to
"NOMINAL" both internally and externally (notifying the user). Data
acquisition is handled similarly through monitoring of appropriate bit/
symbol-sync lock and frame-sync lock parameters.
6.3 FAULT DETECTION
On the surface, fault detection seems trivial: identify anomalous
conditions through the monitoring of performance parameters or through
user notification and initiate the Fault diagnosis process. Upon closer
inspection, the problem becomes more complex and logic-based than one
would first expect. Before operators can recognize an out-of-tolerance
or out-of-range condition, they must First identify (albeit subconsciously)
the nominal value or range that is exceeded. For example, nominal
signal strength range will vary among users and allocated equipment
chains. Operators also routinely ignore apparent signal or data
dropouts caused by service configurations, reconfigurations, and
service-to-service handovers. The ability to differentiate seemingly
anomalous behavior from actual anomalous behavior is an expert
capability that is easily overlooked. FIESTA anticipates the majority
of these types of conditions and does not open up diagnostic episodes
for expected service dropouts. This capability proves to be extremely
important for system performance considerations to avoid paying
unnecessary diagnostic processing penalties and to minimize False
alarms.
Fault detection rules provide an independent source of network status
information to the diagnostic rules. Diagnostic rules rely on this
network status data to reason about current conditions. The detection
rules monitor for anomalous conditions, detect non-nominal parameters
and initiate diagnostic episodes based on detected conditions, continue
-18- _
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to monitor and provide network status information to the diagnostic
rules through a diagnostic episode, and determine whenthe diagnostic
episode can be terminated.
6.4 FAULTDIAGNOSIS
To model the fault diagnosis process, the FIESTAdesign tried to parallel
the thought patterns of the experts by selecting the most likely Fault
from a pool of knownpossibilities. While experts often arrive at the
solution immediately, the subconscious steps they took to get there will
comprise the diagnostic methodology FIESTAneeds to follow. The model
developed involves hypothesizing all knownfault causes and fault
locations (at a high level), immediately ruling out someor most, and
pursuing others to a lower level of detail. This hierarchical fault
cause/location model utilizes a hypothetical reasoning structure to rank
the possibilities and present the most likely pair.
The highest level hierarchical breakdownoccurs between fault location
and fault cause. Both of these branches provide significant information
on fault conditions in the network. The two branches can be viewed as
two independent experts, a fault location expert who determines the
point at which data was lost and a fault cause expert who explains
why. AFter their analysis, the two experts confer and present the most
likely fault location and cause to provide a twofold explanation of the
anomaly.
Utilizing the natural hierarchy of TDRSSNetwork fault causes and fault
locations provides FIESTAwith the flexibility to diagnose locations and
causes in as muchdetail as possible. In somecases, the available data
maynot be sufficient to pin downa specific piece of equipment or a
particular network operator, but the data may be sufficient to isolate
the location to a network element (e.g., a specific ground terminal),
set of elements (e.g., either the Shuttle or the relay satellite), or
isolate the cause to an operational type of error at a high level.
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Hence, this structure attempts to give the diagnosis as much flexibility
and depth to accommodate varying levels of operator experience and skill
and to adapt to a variety of data availability conditions.
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6.5 UNCERTAINTY MANAGEMENT
A fundamental design characteristic of an expert system is its uncer-
tainty management approach. The inferences humans make are often
uncertain; certain conditions may "suggest," "sometimes result in," or
"may mean" a corresponding conclusion. Thus, a mechanism must be
developed to:
Represent probabilistic statements;
Gather and combine evidence for and/or against a certain
hypothesis; and
Present this hypothesis and its "certainty" to the user.
Various alternatives exist for representation of uncertainty (Dempster-
Sharer Theory of Evidence, fuzzy logic, Bayesian inference). The
technique chosen For FIESTA was the MYCIN CF Model [1].
The Following reasons form the basis for our choice of the CF Model:
(1) the MYCIN CF Model is a standard in the Field in that it has with-
stood the test of time, scrutiny, and numerous implementations outside
of its original application; (2) the MYCIN domain was diagnostic as is
FIESTA's -- FIESTA monitors incoming symptoms (network performance
data), detects and diagnoses the problem and acts as an operational
consultant; and (3) this model is easily implementable via LISP and ART
code. Another feature we have Found through our prototyping efforts is
that the CF Model is easily understandable and integrates well into the
operational psyche of its intended user community.
[11 Buchanan, B. G., and Shortcliff, E. M., 1984. Rule-Based Expert
System: The MYCIN Experiments of the Stanford Heuristic Programming
Project, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley.
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This paper has presented some highlights of the expert system FIESTA and
the knowledge engineering effort which has supported its development.
FIESTA is targeted for on-line deployment in the NCC. Current
development efforts are focused on the transition from its current
standalone prototype mode to that of an on-line test bed environment.
Issues of real-time data acquisition and real-time performance of the
demonstrated capabilities are currently being addressed. These capa-
bilities support the operational concepts of automation and provide an
illustration of how expert system methodology can expand automation
concepts to include reasoning and decision aid support.
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